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In the last decade there have been a number of 
internal and external reviews of the performance of 
the South African Police Service (SAPS). ‘Review’ is 
used here as a collective term, inclusive of internal 
inspections and external evaluations or audits of 
police performance. These reviews, including two 
formal commissions of inquiry, have confirmed the 
existence of deep-lying and pervasive inadequacies 
in the performance of the SAPS. Such inadequacies 
include issues such as ill-discipline, corruption, poor 
‘command and control’, especially at local level, a 
lack of regular and thorough internal inspections 
and, even when these are conducted, an inability to 
effectively address issues. 
This article looks at some of these reviews in order 
to establish to what extent they have led to an 
accountable implementation of recommendations. 
More specifically, this discussion will focus on the 
following reviews: 
•	 SAPS	Policy	Advisory	Council	reports	
•	 Report	on	Parliament’s	Detective	Dialogue
•	 National	Development	Plan	2030:	Our	future	–	
make it work 
•	 SAPS	National	Inspectorate:	Basic	policing	indaba
•	 Report	of	the	Khayelitsha	Commission	of	Inquiry
In spite of clear findings and recommendations in 
all these reports, there is little evidence that the 
situation has improved. On the contrary, not only 
do consecutive reviews identify the continued 
prevalence of much the same weaknesses, but 
matters appear to be deteriorating. There is an 
apparent unwillingness or inability within the SAPS to 
acknowledge and engage with these major problems 
and to implement measures to address them. 
In an article by Frank Hughes and Lisa Andre in The 
Police Chief, they discuss repeat officer misconduct 
and the value of an early warning system for 
control and the promotion of accountability within a 
police department.1 The link between misconduct 
and systemic problems within police agencies 
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more broadly is obvious, as is the need for timely 
interventions. In relation to the importance and 
benefits of an early warning system and the need for 
remedial action, they conclude that:
… the system must first properly identify 
the appropriate variables that are causing 
problems for the agency. These variables may 
differ for individual police agencies based on 
their personnel, range of services offered, and 
community demographics. Fear of liability 
exposure from having such a system should 
never be allowed to keep an agency from 
doing something that it believes reinforces the 
mission of law enforcement and its obligation 
of accountability to the public. Once police 
agencies identify their potential problem officers 
using an [Early Warning System], they can 
implement appropriate intervention strategies 
and monitoring techniques with a higher level  
of confidence.2
This article will explore the nature of the pervasive 
systemic inadequacies within the police and the lack 
of decisive interventions to address those. 
The need for police reviews, 
and their focus
Reviews of the police should not be perceived or 
approached as a witch-hunt aimed at targeting 
individual police officers. It is much rather about 
identifying weaknesses or shortcomings in the 
structure and functioning of the police as an 
integrated system, and in rectifying these where 
necessary. As John Fuller points out: 
A staff inspection when done correctly 
is a favorably proactive practice. The 
purpose is to uncover potential problems 
and develop solutions within the agency’s 
scope of operations before the problems 
reach proportions that negatively affect the 
department and its personnel and before the 
problems generate negative media attention and 
community criticism.3 
This does not, of course, imply that wrongdoing on 
the part of individuals or groups, when uncovered, 
should be ignored. On the contrary, although this 
should not be the primary focus of inspections, 
undue conduct, whenever it is detected, should result 
in some form of punitive action, either disciplinary 
steps or criminal prosecution, depending on the 
nature of the conduct. 
External reviews of the police will always find it more 
difficult to ensure that in addition to recommendations 
for corrective measures, disciplinary or criminal action 
is taken against offending members of the police. 
Examples of such external reviews can be found in 
inspections by the Office of the Auditor General, the 
Civilian Secretariat for Police and even Parliament’s 
Portfolio Committee on Police. To some extent the 
Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID) 
is another good example. Its constituting legislation, 
the Independent Police Investigative Directorate 
(IPID, Act 1 of 2011), does give it more teeth than its  
predecessor, the Independent Complaints Directorate 
(ICD), but does not specifically mandate it to inspect 
or review the police.4 IPID personnel can, however, 
make important contributions towards addressing 
systemic weaknesses in the police, for example by 
doing a simple analysis of criminal investigations that 
might reveal some of the underlying weaknesses that 
allow for this type of conduct. 
The importance and, in particular, the correct focus 
of inspections are also highlighted in a report by 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), published in 2012.5 Although 
the report deals with inspections in a business 
environment, it concludes that inspections 
and their enforcement systems need to be 
constantly improved in order to ‘ensure that 
inspections and enforcement are more risk-based 
focused, and aim more at promoting compliance and 
ensuring positive outcomes than at detecting and 
punishing violations’.6
Internal reviews and the policy 
advisory council
The SAPS has always had a system of internal 
inspections, largely conducted by the National 
Inspectorate, but its effectiveness has long been 
questioned. According to Bilkis Omar, the ‘many 
challenges’ that ‘persist’ at local police level are 
probably a result of the declining ability of the 
Inspectorate to carry out inspections and evaluations 
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regularly and efficiently.7 It must be added that even 
where inspections are carried out regularly and 
efficiently, it is hardly useful if little or nothing is done 
to fix the problem. 
The Divisional Commissioner of the National 
Inspectorate, Lt.-Gen. Sharon Jephta, appointed 
on 1 February 2015, seemed to agree. Shortly after 
her appointment, on 19 March 2015, she issued an 
interim instruction aimed at addressing this specific 
problem. For example, paragraph 2 of the instruction 
reads as follows:
The feedback reports regarding the 
implementation of the inspection and evaluation 
findings submitted, in particular to the 
Inspectorate, are not comprehensive to indicate 
the rectification of the shortcomings indicated in 
respective reports [Own emphasis]8
The persisting challenges Omar refers to include 
‘the manipulation of crime statistics, missing case 
dockets, under-resourcing, inefficient management, 
lack of discipline and ineffective crime combating 
at police stations across the country’.9 These 
‘challenges’ amount to systemic weaknesses and 
‘often lead to poor service delivery, hamper policing 
to communities, create feelings of insecurity and fail 
to bring down levels of crime’.10
In obvious recognition that the Inspectorate 
and other internal mechanisms were unable, on 
their own, to sufficiently identify and address the 
pervasive weaknesses in the police, the then national 
commissioner of the SAPS, Jackie Selebi, decided 
in October 2006 to appoint ‘an independent body, 
composed of persons with extensive policing 
experience’ to assist the SAPS, inter alia, by:11
•	 Identifying	and	comprehensively	reviewing	issues	
that need to be addressed by the SAPS in order to 
improve its effectiveness in the combating of crime 
•	 Enhancing	the	capacity	of	the	management	of	the	
SAPS to address critical policing issues
This independent body of experienced persons was 
called the Policy Advisory Council and was made up 
of retired senior members of the SAPS management 
team.12 The council comprised two former deputy 
national commissioners (one of them acting as 
chairperson), five former divisional commissioners 
and eight former provincial commissioners.13 
Between them they shared experience and 
expertise that covered many years of management, 
investigation and other operational areas of policing, 
and also of support services.
Over a period of two years the council carried out 
inspections at 858 police stations, representing 
77% of the 1 116 police stations countrywide.14 
Subsequent to these visits the council compiled two 
reports, the first covering the period November 2006 
to October 2007 and the second report November 
2007 to October 2008.15 According to the council’s 
first report, it adopted a ‘developmental approach’ 
that included an ‘on the ground identification and 
rectification of shortcomings/issues that require 
attention and that could be fixed on the spot or in the 
short term’.16 They mention a number of problems 
‘rectified’ during their visits, such as arranging, 
with the assistance of provincial commissioners, 
the ‘movement and replacement’ of ineffective and 
inefficient commanders.17
The two reports painted a bleak picture of the 
level of management, efficiency and capability 
at police stations generally and made pertinent 
recommendations about what was needed to 
address these deficiencies. After the council’s first 
interim report to the SAPS Management Forum on 24 
April 2007, the forum was sufficiently concerned for 
the national commissioner to announce the formation 
of ‘management task teams’ to attend to the issues 
raised by the council.18 The activities of these 
management task teams, however, were clouded in 
secrecy. As a consequence it was not clear whether 
they ever became operational and actually performed 
any tasks.
Besides the many shortcomings identified by the 
council, are specific findings in relation to systemic 
weaknesses that relate to management (command 
and control), discipline, and detectives and 
inspections. (The period for each report is indicated 
alongside each finding.)
•	 Command,	control	and	discipline:
• 2006/2007: There is a general lack of command 
and control within the police service at local level. 
Resultant poor levels of discipline and high levels 
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of corruption are of serious concern … Tasks are 
allocated with no follow up, case dockets are not 
inspected or inspected in a haphazard manner. 
Supervision and inspection are neglected.19  
• 2006/2007: An in-depth investigation was 
done and it was found that there is indeed a 
disciplinary problem at station level. The general 
level of discipline is poor. Absence without 
 leave and neglect of duty are common at many 
police stations.20
• 2007/2008: Many of the problems of the police 
are the direct result of a breakdown in 
 command and control and a lack of supervision 
in certain areas. In most instances, poor service 
delivery, maladministration, ill discipline and 
corruption have at their core a lack of 
 supervision and control.21
•	 Detectives:
• 2006/2007: The Detective Service is being 
neglected in terms of focus and resources. Many 
station commissioners simply leave the Detective 
Service to ‘carry on’ on their own. There is little or 
no support given. Detectives generally have the 
worst accommodation and least resources.22
• 2006/2007: At many branches there is no 
proper command and control. Many branch 
commanders are incompetent. Group com-
manders and supervisors lack skills, experience, 
commitment, dedication and discipline.23
• 2006/2007: Docket inspections … in many 
instances are not done in accordance with 
required standards and policies.24
•	 Inspections:
• 2006/2007: The system of inspections in 
the police is totally inadequate. The National 
Inspectorate was also found wanting and is 
clearly not focused correctly, nor functioning 
optimally.25 
• 2007/2008: Visits to stations and units … 
revealed that at some stations proper inspections 
from the area/provincial and national level have 
not been conducted for long periods (years). At 
most stations regular inspections are not done.26
• 2007/2008: It is seldom or ever that a full 
inspection is done. Sufficient appropriate capacity 
to manage and do inspections properly does not 
seem to exist at any level.27
The Policy Advisory Council went on to cover a 
large number of other problems and deficiencies 
identified at police stations and police units, such as 
in the implementation of sector policing, operational 
planning, crime intelligence, the Forensic Science 
Laboratory and Criminal Record Centre, etc. 
However, apart from the ‘rectifications’ they made 
during their visits, there was little evidence that their 
findings and recommendations led to any meaningful 
improvements. After their second report, council 
members’ contracts were not renewed, in spite of 
their expressed willingness to continue their work.28 
Report on Parliament’s 
detective dialogue  
On 5 September 2012 Parliament’s Portfolio 
Committee on Police conducted a dialogue to 
discuss the state of the SAPS detectives and to 
determine what could be done to make them more 
efficient and effective.29 According to the committee, 
the dialogue was motivated by the minister of police’s 
budget vote speech in Parliament on 9 May 2012, 
where he declared 2012 as the ‘year of the detective’, 
and also by ‘oversight visits’ by the committee over 
the years to police stations where they identified 
‘numerous challenges’ with respect to detectives.30 
A number of institutions and independent experts 
made oral and written presentations during the 
dialogue. Other participants included 
representatives from civil society, academics, 
training organisations and the police, as well as from 
provincial executive councils.31
After each of the presentations there was a fairly 
robust debate and towards the end of the dialogue, 
Lt.-Gen. Godfrey Lebeya, at the time Deputy 
National Commissioner: Crime Detection, highlighted 
some of the more pertinent issues that emerged 
from the discussions:
•	 Corruption:	The	SAPS	acknowledges	various	
challenges regarding corruption in the service, 
which must be addressed as a matter of urgency.
53SA Crime QuArterly No. 53 • SePt 2015
•	 Retention:	The	detective	environment	within	SAPS	
is not designed to retain staff and the organisation 
is losing highly skilled detectives due to the lack of 
a properly developed retention strategy.
•	 Case	loads:	The	heavy	case	loads	of	detectives	
lead to short cuts being taken, to the detriment  
of investigations.
•	 Resources:	The	detective	environment	is	not	
sufficiently resourced in terms of personnel, 
computers, laptops, cellular phones and vehicles. 
•	Quality:	The	quality	of	investigations	must	
 be improved.
•	 Discipline:	The	SAPS	acknowledges	that	the	
general discipline of detectives needs to be 
addressed. 
•	 Training:	The	challenges	faced	regarding	the	
training of detectives, especially in basic 
 courses like the Basic Learning Programme, 
 were acknowledged.32
The committee, in its recommendations, expressed 
a deep concern with, among others, the lack of a 
clear career path for detectives, the demoralising 
effect of corruption, and the lack of effective 
management at ‘station, unit and branch level’.33 
The lack of effective management was also identified 
as a key concern by the chairperson of the Portfolio 
Committee, as she then was, Annelise van Wyk, in 
her address to Parliament on 8 November 2012.34 
Finally, the committee recommended that its report 
and recommendations:
… be elevated to the level of the Minister 
[of Police] so that we can ensure that the 
implementation of these recommendations 
take place … [and that the] management 
within the detective service, together with 
the Civilian Secretariat for Police … must 
develop a comprehensive response to these 
recommendations and other challenges 
highlighted during the Detective Dialogue.35
At the time of writing not much was publicly 
known regarding progress on the  ‘comprehensive 
response’. From discussions with staff at the 
Civilian Secretariat for Police it would appear that 
a lot of work had been done in this regard and 
that the process was ongoing.36 For example, the 
Secretariat, in consultation with the SAPS, compiled 
a ‘turnaround strategy’ for the detectives, which it 
presented to Parliament on 21 May 2013. This was 
followed by a draft policy document for the detectives 
that is still awaiting the approval of the Minister.37 
While it was encouraging that the Portfolio 
Committee’s report was taken seriously, it was also 
worrying that it took more than two and a half years 
to deliver a draft policy intended to address the 
urgent and serious deficiencies already identified in 
September 2012.
The National Development Plan (NDP)
Chapter 12 of the National Development Plan 2030: 
Our future – make it work, also, almost indirectly, 
refers to major weaknesses in the police, which 
it ascribes largely to a lack of professionalism, 
the remilitarisation of the police, and leadership 
challenges.38 The NDP is a product of the National 
Planning Commission (NPC), appointed by Zuma in 
May 2010 to draft a vision and national development 
plan for South Africa.39 The NPC was appointed as 
an advisory body consisting of 26 people drawn 
largely from outside government and chosen for their 
expertise in key areas. They consulted widely with 
stakeholders and the public more broadly before 
submitting their plan (the NDP) to the president in 
August 2012. In September 2012 cabinet announced 
its endorsement of the NDP and steps to start the 
implementation process.40
Among the diverse and broad thematic areas 
covered in the NDP’s 15 chapters, chapter 12 
focused on ‘building safer communities’. Much 
of this chapter focused on the police service, its 
inefficiencies, and how these could be addressed. 
Most of these inefficiencies were not distinctly 
identified, but could be discerned from a reading of 
the recommendations. Accordingly, the following are 
examples of the most pertinent recommendations in 
the NDP:
•	 The	code	of	conduct	should	be	included	in	the	
disciplinary regulations and performance 
 appraisal system and periodic checks should 
be conducted on the level of understanding and 
practice of the code.
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•	 A	national	policing	board	should	be	established	
with multi-sectoral and multi-disciplinary expertise 
to set [objective] standards for recruitment, 
selection, appointment and promotion.
•	 A	competency	assessment	of	all	officers	should	
be conducted to rate them accordingly (this 
should not be linked to ranks).  
•	 In	the	next	five	years	a	two-stream	system	should	
be developed to create high-calibre officers and 
recruits (non-commissioned officer and officer 
streams) to be trained as professionals.
•	 The	national	commissioner	and	deputy	national	
commissioners should be appointed by the 
president only on recommendations by a 
selection panel that would select and interview 
candidates against objective criteria. 
•	 The	police	‘force’	must	demilitarise	and	the	
organisational culture and subcultures of the 
police should be reviewed to assess the effects 
of militarisation, demilitarisation, remilitarisation 
and ‘the serial crises of top management’.
These were all good recommendations and 
if implemented could go a long way towards 
effectively addressing the pervasive problems 
of the SAPS. But it is already three years since 
cabinet approved the NDP and there are no 
concrete signs of implementation. At the time of 
writing, the only indication that the Department of 
Police was considering plans for implementation 
was contained in the draft White Paper on the 
Police. However, although it included a number 
of NDP recommendations, the draft White 
Paper was conspicuously silent on others, 
such as those relating to the appointment of 
the national commissioner and deputy national 
commissioners.41
It is also a moot question as to what happened 
to the cabinet committee whose establishment 
was announced on 7 September 2012 to develop 
targets and integrated implementation plans,42 and 
to what extent this committee may be involved in 
the implementation of recommendations affecting 
the SAPS.
SAPS National Inspectorate Report
The SAPS’s Inspectorate Division held a ‘Basic 
Policing Indaba’ from 20 to 21 January 2015. Very 
little is known about the indaba outside of the police 
and the author was only able to access a copy of 
a Powerpoint presentation highlighting inspection 
findings in relation to ‘basic policing’ and ‘service 
delivery’ complaints against the police.43 This 
apparent secretiveness makes it almost impossible 
to find publicly accessible police reports addressing 
issues relating to systemic weaknesses. For example, 
the SAPS Annual Report for 2013/14, in a section 
covering the Inspectorate, mentioned only the type 
and number of inspections done.44 Nothing was 
reported on what was found. Much the same can 
be said about the section on internal audits, the only 
difference being that it concluded by identifying ‘areas 
of concern’, inter alia, the ‘slow implementation of 
internal audit recommendations or agreed corrective 
actions’ and ‘delays in consequence management’.45  
Therefore, rather than assisting the SAPS in hiding 
these systemic problems and its seeming inability to 
effectively address them, it is important that every 
piece of information is exposed to public scrutiny. 
Only then will we be able to ensure that the pervasive 
systemic problems that undermine professional 
policing receive the corrective attention they require.
The mandate of the Inspectorate was, inter alia, 
to ‘report to the national commissioner on the 
effectiveness, efficiency and quality of service 
delivery by the [SAPS]’.46 In the Powerpoint report 
the inspection findings (from visits to police stations) 
were categorised as Visible Policing; Detectives; 
Crime Intelligence; and Support Services. It did not 
specify the period covered, but it is assumed that 
these are for inspections over time and countrywide. 
The findings were consistent with those in the reports 
already referred to and, as will be shown, with those 
in the report of the Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry. 
Some of the findings for the first three categories are 
listed below:47
•	 Visible	policing:
• ‘Members on reliefs are not managed accordingly 
[sic]’ [‘Accordingly’ in this sense is a reference to 
Standing Orders and other instructions]. 
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• ‘Handing over between reliefs and station 
commanders is not correctly done.’
• ‘Management and supervision of sector policing 
by only one sector commander impacts 
negatively on policing.’ [This finding reflects on 
staff shortages, work load, lack of appropriate 
training, etc.]
• ‘Quality of statements is generally poor … 
statements are not completed in accordance 
with prescribed guidelines, do not contain 
the elements of the crime, are not signed by 
deponents, and are not sworn to/affirmed by 
Commissioner of Oaths.’
• ‘Exhibits [are] not properly managed and 
[as] such lead to evidential value of exhibit[s] 
being tarnished and the chain of evidence 
compromised.’
• ‘Manipulation of crime information is a means of 
improving performance or efficiency of a station.’
•	 Detectives:
• ‘Excessive case loads.’
• ‘Investigation of some cases is substandard.’
• ‘Complainants are not continuously updated 
about developments in their cases.’
• ‘Investigating officers do not comply with 
instructions from detective commanders and/or 
requests from public prosecutors.’
• ‘Investigating officers do not enquire about the 
linkage of suspects to other cases.’
• ‘Crime scenes are not managed properly.’
• ‘Cases are closed or filed incorrectly.’
•	 Crime	Intelligence:	
• ‘Crime intelligence capacity is not optimally 
utilised at station level to bolster crime 
prevention, combating and detection.’
• ‘Crime intelligence products such as CTA [crime 
threat analysis] and CPA [crime pattern analysis] 
do not have a standardised format and their 
content differs from station to station,
• ‘CIOs [Crime Intelligence Officers] are unable to 
explain the purpose of a properly constituted 
Station Intelligence Profile (SIP) and its 
importance [for] policing.’
Command and control was again identified as 
a ‘contributing factor’ for these inefficiencies, 
along with a ‘lack of consequence management 
and implementation of corrective measures’ and 
‘disciplinary interventions [that] are not consistently 
implemented and finalised speedily’.48 However, 
apart from resolving that the many instructions that 
exist in this regard needed to again be brought to the 
attention of all members and commanders, there was 
no firm indication from this report that action would 
be taken to ensure ‘consequence management’ and 
speedy ‘disciplinary interventions’. The only promise 
of some form of action was from the aforementioned 
instruction issued by Jephta in March 2015 that 
feedback reports regarding the implementation of the 
inspection and evaluation findings should forthwith 
include steps in relation to ‘the rectification of the 
shortcomings indicated in respective reports’.49
Report by the Khayelitsha 
Commission of Inquiry
For many years the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) 
called for the establishment of a judicial commission 
of inquiry independently and authoritatively to ‘assess 
the functioning of the SAPS and its leadership’.50 
Since then two commissions of inquiry with a focus 
on the police were established. The Khayelitsha 
Commission of Inquiry was established in August 
2012 and the Marikana Commission of Inquiry in 
September 2012. The terms of reference of the 
Marikana Commission, unlike that of the Khayelitsha 
Commission, were focused on a specific incident, i.e. 
the killing by the police of 34 striking mineworkers on 
16 August 2012.51 As this article is concerned with 
the pervasive systemic problems in the police, and 
since the Marikana Commission does not contain 
any specific findings in this regard, the report by the 
latter commission is not discussed any further in this 
article.52
When the Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry 
was appointed, it also did not fully fit the profile 
of the commission called for by the ISS, as it was 
geographically restricted and – mainly because it 
was appointed by the premier of the Western Cape – 
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The commission concluded its report with 20 
recommendations aimed at addressing these 
inefficiencies. Six of the recommendations are 
especially dependent on the involvement of the SAPS 
at national and provincial level:57
•	 The	establishment	of	an	oversight	and	monitoring	
team to ensure that the inefficiencies identified at 
the three Khayelitsha police stations are eradicated 
•	 A	change	management	process	for	leadership	
within the Khayelitsha cluster, the Khayelitsha FCS 
Unit and the three Khayelitsha police stations
•	 A	strategic	review	of	detective	services	in	
Khayelitsha by the Provincial Commissioner
•	 The	development	of	provincial	guidelines	in	relation	
to the visible policing of informal neighbourhoods
•	 Review	of	the	procedures	by	which	complaints	
against members of the SAPS are dealt with both 
by the SAPS and the IPID
•	 A	memorandum	of	understanding	to	be	entered	
into between the Department of Community Safety 
(DoCS) and the SAPS to facilitate DoCS’ carrying 
out its constitutional mandate to monitor police 
conduct and oversee police efficiency 
 and effectiveness
According to media reports soon after the release 
of the report in August 2014, the minister of police 
indicated that he found the recommendations 
acceptable and would work with the province 
towards implementation.58 The SAPS apparently 
also indicated its ‘unequivocal’ support for 
implementation,59 and according to Dan Plato, 
MEC for Community Safety in the Western Cape, 
interviewed two weeks after the release of the report, 
the provincial government was already working on an 
implementation plan.60 
At the time of writing little else was publicly 
available on progress in implementing the 
commission’s recommendations.
Conclusion
It is astonishing that the pervasive problems 
undermining the effective and efficient performance of 
the SAPS have been allowed to continue, in spite of 
being identified repeatedly by inspections and other 
lacked the support of central government. However, 
the commission was established in terms of section 
1 of the Western Cape Provincial Commissions Act 
1998 (Act 10 of 1998), allowing it to conduct an 
independent and authoritative review of the police, 
in spite of these limitations, and it was focused on 
systemic problems in the police.53 
The commission’s terms of reference were, inter alia: 
‘to investigate complaints received by the Premier 
relating to allegations of inefficiency of the South 
African Police Service stationed at [Khayelitsha Site 
B, Lingelethu West and Harare]’.54 The commission 
found a range of systemic and overlapping reasons 
why the inefficiencies in policing at the three 
Khayelitsha police stations and the Khayelitsha FCS 
unit (Family Violence, Child Protection and Sexual 
Offences Unit), identified by SAPS inspection reports 
over time, have not been addressed. But according 
to the commission, the most important reason was 
poor management at station level, cluster level and 
provincial level.55
Some of the key findings included in the wide range 
of inefficiencies identified by the commission were:56 
•	 There	are	no	established	guidelines	for	patrols	of	
informal neighbourhoods, and by and large, these 
do not seem to take place in Khayelitsha
•	Many	crimes	reported	to	the	three	Khayelitsha	
police stations and the FCS Unit are not 
investigated properly or at all, and the commission 
considers the quality of detective services at the 
three police stations to be close to a crisis point
•	 The	system	of	crime	intelligence	is	not	functioning	
according to SAPS national guidelines at any of the 
three Khayelitsha police stations
•	 Crime	scene	management	in	Khayelitsha	is	often	
not in accordance with the prescribed protocol, 
partly because of environmental difficulties but also 
because of the lack of basic equipment 
 and training
•	Management	at	the	three	police	stations,	the	
cluster office and the FCS Unit is ineffective
•	 The	SAPS	does	not	comply	with	the	obligations	
imposed upon it by the Domestic Violence Act 
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reviews over at least the last decade. That this is 
the case reflects badly on police management and 
also, indirectly, on the Civilian Secretariat for Police, 
which should have had systems in place to ensure 
that internal processes were monitored and effective 
steps taken to address systemic weaknesses.
It is to some extent understandable that the police 
can avoid public scrutiny of and accountability 
for their internal inspections and evaluations, 
since they are able to hide behind the excuse of 
confidentiality. It is, however, less obvious why 
external reviews appear to be largely ignored or 
at least not vigorously applied by or in relation to 
the police. Parliament certainly has the necessary 
authority, but its wheels appear to be grinding at an 
embarrassingly slow speed and as a result it seems 
to be largely ineffective. The Khayelitsha Commission 
of Inquiry confirmed what we already know. As with 
all other reviews, the impact of commissions of 
inquiry is dependent on the willingness and ability 
of those who appointed them to ensure that their 
recommendations are properly implemented. The 
failure to either timeously identify system failures or 
ensure appropriate interventions have had and will 
continue to have dire consequences for the police 
organisation and for the citizenry at large.
To comment on this article visit 
http://www.issafrica.org/sacq.php
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